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Today Alaska Native tribes face one of their most difficult challenges 
since the days of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA).  
Ever since the United States Supreme Court ruled in Alaska v. Native 
Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1998), that 
ANCSA largely extinguished “Indian country” in Alaska, and thus the 
tribes’ territorial jurisdiction, the extent of Alaska tribal sovereignty 
and authority has been shrouded in uncertainty.  In the context of a 
vigorous debate in which the extent and perhaps the very survival of 
Alaska tribal sovereignty is at stake, this Article offers: (1) an 
analysis of Alaska tribes’ current jurisdiction, including areas of 
uncertainty due to their unique status as “sovereigns without 
territorial reach”; and (2) a range of proposals designed to resolve 
those uncertainties and anomalies by at least partially restoring the 
“Indian country” status of, and thus tribal territorial jurisdiction 
over, some tribal lands in Alaska.  Using rural justice and law 
enforcement as a central example, the authors demonstrate that 
restoring Indian country to Alaska would promote numerous public 
policy objectives, benefiting both the tribes and the State. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: TRIBAL STATUS  
AND JURISDICTION AT A CROSSROADS 
Rural Alaska is one of the most dangerous places to live in the 
United States, in large part because of an alarming lack of adequate law 
enforcement and justice services.1  The state’s federally recognized 
tribes, the governments with an actual physical presence in rural Alaska, 
have been hamstrung in their attempts to assist in providing these 
services by doubts concerning their criminal jurisdiction.  We propose 
that Congress remove these doubts by restoring the “Indian country” 
status of Alaska tribal lands, making them subject to concurrent state and 
tribal jurisdiction.  This would benefit all rural residents, Native and 
non-Native alike, by enabling better provision of law enforcement as 
well as other services.  As this Article will make clear, tribal sovereignty 
is part of the solution to rural Alaska’s problems, not the threat that some 
perceive. 
A. The Assault on Alaska Tribal Sovereignty 
Alaska tribes have reached a crossroads in their journey to protect 
their sovereignty and self-determination.  In recent decades the tribes 
have been clearly recognized as sovereigns enjoying government-to-
government relationships with the United States, like those of tribes in 
the lower 48 states,2 but that status has been attacked for many years and 
continues to be threatened by several recent developments.  The 
Secretary of the Interior’s authority to recognize Alaska Native villages 
as tribes has been challenged legally and politically.3  For instance, the 
State of Alaska recently has taken the position that Alaska tribes lack 
 
 1. To its credit, the State of Alaska has long acknowledged the problem.  See, e.g., 
ALASKA DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, THE VILLAGE PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER PROGRAM 1 
(1980) [hereinafter VILLAGE PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER PROGRAM] (“Rural Alaska has the 
distinction of having the worst record for public safety of any of the 50 states.”); ALASKA 
DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN RURAL ALASKA VILLAGES (2004) 
(indicating that, of 197 rural villages, 48 have no State Trooper presence but only a 
Village Public Safety Officer, while 68 rural villages have no state law enforcement 
presence at all). 
 2. See infra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Pl.’s Compl., Lieb v. Orutsararmiut Native Council, No. A03-0223 CV 
(Sept. 23, 2003); Pl.’s First Am. Compl., Sitton v. Native Vill. of Northway, No. A03-
0134 CV (Sept. 23, 2003).  For a discussion of these complaints, see infra note 15.  In 
December 2001, the two majority leaders of the Alaska State Senate and House wrote to 
Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton asking that she conduct a “‘de novo legal and 
policy review’ of the status of tribes in Alaska,” hoping that the Secretary would de-
recognize Alaska tribes.  Letter from Rick Halford & Brian Porter to Gale Norton, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior (Dec. 10, 2001) (on file with authors). 
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inherent sovereign authority over child protection matters.4  
Additionally, Senator Ted Stevens, among others, has proposed that 
funding for programs and services for Alaska Natives be funneled 
through state agencies and large regional corporations rather than 
through tribes.5  These developments threaten to make local tribal 
governments largely irrelevant to the provision of funding and services 
to Natives in Alaska, and severely undermine tribal self-determination 
and the government-to-government relationship of Alaska tribes to the 
United States. 
Bedeviled by contradictory pronouncements on their jurisdictional 
authority, and besieged by assaults on their tribal status, Alaska tribes 
face the threat of being swallowed up in “regionalization,” if not 
eliminated altogether.  The regionalization debate has raised questions 
about the scope of tribal jurisdiction in Alaska, in which the territorial 
jurisdiction traditionally defined as “Indian country” is largely absent.6  
 
 4. See Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. (Oct. 1, 2004).  For a brief discussion of this opinion, 
see text accompanying infra notes 79–83. 
 5. See, e.g., S. 1585, 108th Cong. § 109 (2004) (redirecting funds currently 
supporting tribal law enforcement and justice systems in Alaska from the U.S. 
Department of Justice to the State of Alaska, effectively depriving tribes of funding for 
tribal police and courts).  Senator Stevens (R-Alaska) has also proposed consolidating 
funding for tribal housing in regional housing entities under a new Title IX of the Native 
American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA).  Although this 
proposal never materialized as an actual bill, the idea of regionalizing Alaska 
NAHASDA funding is still alive.  The 2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act contains a 
directive to the General Accounting Office (GAO) to “immediately begin a review” of 
the federal programs benefiting rural communities in Alaska, including housing: “With 
respect to housing programs, the study shall determine the number of houses built by 
each Native housing authority including the cost per house.”  Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 62, § 112.  Senator Stevens 
has since reportedly disclaimed any interest in regionalization, but the disclaimer has yet 
to be reflected in legislative action.  See Jon Grover, Tribes Fear Stevens Playing Word 
Games, ARCTIC SOUNDER, Nov. 7, 2004, at 1. 
More recently, the 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act contains several 
provisions that appear to continue the “regionalization” agenda.  For example, § 343 
extends until Fiscal Year 2007 the ban on Alaska villages contracting on their own under 
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act  if they are within the area 
served by a Native regional health entity.  H.R. 4818, 108th Cong. § 343(a) (2004).  
Language in the Conference Report also directs that $15 million in substance abuse 
funds be distributed in part to Native regional health organizations and in part to the 
State of Alaska, which is then directed to redistribute those funds to regional non-profit 
corporations to operate the Village Public Safety Officer Program.  See H.R. CONF. REP. 
NO. 108-792, at 280 (bill language) & 1084 (report language), reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2577, 2831; see also S. REP. NO. 108-341, at 73. 
 6. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998), 
discussed infra section I.C. 
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This Article sketches the contours of Alaska tribal jurisdiction as it 
currently exists, points out areas of uncertainty, and proposes the 
reintroduction of a geographic component to Alaska tribal jurisdiction.  
Using rural justice and law enforcement as our central example, we 
argue that by (re)introducing “Indian country” in Alaska as a description 
of tribal territorial jurisdiction, Congress could eliminate many of the 
uncertainties that plague Alaska tribes, while improving the delivery of 
services to rural Alaskans, Native and non-Native alike. 
B. A Brief History of Tribal Status in Alaska 
The tribal status of Alaska Native Village governments was unclear 
and hotly contested during the years following passage of the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) in 1971.7  Although Congress 
has consistently treated Alaska Native Villages as tribes for purposes of 
eligibility for federal programs and services, the State of Alaska and its 
courts resisted acknowledging the villages as tribes.  For many years, the 
state opposed expansion of tribal governmental powers and the creation 
of Indian country under the motto “Alaska is one country, one people.”8  
The state supreme court endorsed this view in Native Village of Stevens 
v. Alaska Management and Planning:9 “There are not now and never 
have been tribes of Indians in Alaska as that term is used in federal 
Indian law.”10 
In 1993, however, the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior 
(DOI), Thomas Sansonetti, issued an opinion rejecting the notion that 
there were no tribes in Alaska.11  Later that year, and consistent with the 
 
 7. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 339, codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–28 (2000).  The 
status of Alaska Native Village governments was also unclear during the period 
immediately preceding the enactment of ANCSA.  Alaska Native aboriginal land claims 
were jeopardized in the late 1950s and early 1960s by judicial decisions and state land 
selections allowed under the Alaska Statehood Act.  43 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).  In the late 
1960s, the Secretary of the Interior prohibited further state land selections until the issue 
of Native land rights could be resolved.  These factors, in conjunction with the obstacle 
that Native land claims posed to the development of oil reserves, mandated that the 
Native claims issue be resolved expeditiously by congressional action.  See DAVID S. 
CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 156–57 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 8. Admin. Order No. 125 (Gov. Hickel) (Aug. 16, 1991), available at 
http://www.gov.state.ak.us/admin-orders/125.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2005). 
 9. 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988). 
 10. Id. at 35–36 (quoting Metlakatla Indian Cmty. v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 917–18 
(Alaska 1961)).  The court concluded that “Stevens Village does not have sovereign 
immunity because it, like most native groups in Alaska, is not self-governing or in any 
meaningful sense sovereign.”  Id. at 34. 
 11. Solicitor Op. Dep’t of Interior M-36975 (Jan. 11, 1993) [hereinafter Sansonetti 
Opinion]. 
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Sansonetti opinion, the DOI issued a list of 226 villages and regional 
tribes in Alaska recognized and eligible to receive federal Indian Affairs 
services.12  Congress effectively ratified that list by enacting the 
Federally Recognized Tribe List Act in 1994.13  Finally, in 1999, the 
Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged the tribal status and sovereignty of 
Native Villages in John v. Baker.14  Despite sporadic challenges,15 the 
status of village governments as tribes appears well established in state 
and federal law.  The extent and scope of Alaska tribes’ sovereign 
authority is less settled, and provides the initial focus of this Article. 
C. Venetie and Indian Country in Alaska 
“Indian country,” as defined by federal statute, means: (1) all land 
within the limits of a reservation, whether owned in fee or in trust; (2) 
“dependent Indian communities”; and (3) Indian allotments.16  Although 
this definition derives from a criminal statute, the Supreme Court has 
found that it “generally applies as well to questions of civil 
jurisdiction.”17  ANCSA extinguished all the reservations in Alaska, with 
the exception of the Annette Islands Reserve of the Metlakatla Indian 
Community.  While there are some 10,000 allotments in Alaska, these 
form only a small percentage of Native lands in the state, and their 
patchwork pattern prevents a coherent exercise of tribal jurisdiction. 
The key question for many years was whether lands patented under 
ANCSA constituted “dependent Indian communities” within the 
meaning of the Indian country statute.  The United States Supreme Court 
has interpreted this phrase to cover any “area . . . validly set apart for the 
use of Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government.”18  
Arguably, ANCSA lands fit this definition, and that is what the Ninth 
 
 12. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United 
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364, 54,368 (Oct. 21, 1993). 
 13. Pub. L. No. 103-454, 108 Stat. 4791 (Nov. 2, 1994), codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 
479a, 479a-1 (2000). 
 14. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1182 (2000). 
 15. Don Mitchell, who has served as counsel to the Alaska State Legislature, filed 
two lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska in September 2003 on 
behalf of individual plaintiffs, challenging the Secretary of the Interior’s authority to 
recognize Alaska Villages as Indian tribes.  See Pl.’s Compl., Lieb v. Orutsararmiut 
Native Council, No. A03-0223 CV (Sept. 23, 2003); see also Pls.’s First Am. Compl., 
Sitton v. Native Vill. of Northway, No. A03-0134 CV (Sept. 23, 2003).  The arguments 
set out in these two complaints assert that only Congress, not the Secretary of the 
Interior, can recognize a tribe.  Id. 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000). 
 17. DeCoteau v. Dist. County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975). 
 18. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 
505, 511 (1991). 
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Circuit held.19  However, in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal 
Government,20 the United States Supreme Court reversed and held that 
lands transferred to private corporations pursuant to ANCSA satisfied 
neither the federal “set-aside” nor the federal “superintendence” 
requirement.21  The lands were not set aside “for the use of Indians as 
such,” but rather for private, state-chartered Native corporations.22  Nor 
were the lands subject to sufficient federal superintendence; rather, 
ANCSA was intended to avoid a “lengthy wardship or trusteeship.”23  
As a result, the Village’s ANCSA lands did not qualify as “Indian 
country,” even though the lands were subsequently conveyed to the 
Village government, and therefore the Village lacked authority to tax a 
non-Native business operating on those lands.24 
Importantly, the Court also found that ANCSA did not intend to 
terminate tribal sovereignty, but that it left Alaska tribes “sovereigns 
without territorial reach.”25  While some Indian country may remain in 
Alaska (see part IV below), Venetie established that the territorial 
jurisdiction of Alaska tribes does not extend to the 45 million acres of 
land affected by ANCSA—the vast majority of Native lands in Alaska. 
Even outside Indian country, however, Alaska tribes may be able to 
exercise member-based jurisdiction and perhaps jurisdiction over non-
members in specific instances.  The next section examines the basis of 
Native self-government and inherent sovereign power over territory and 
members.  Section III explores the scope of inherent tribal rights and 
member-based jurisdiction even in the absence of Indian country after 
Venetie. 
 
 19. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 
101 F.3d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 20. 522 U.S. 520 (1998). 
 21. Id. at 532. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 533 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (2000)).  Ironically, the Village was able 
to exercise jurisdiction over its lands when under federal superintendence, but once 
“free” of that superintendence, Village lands fell under the jurisdiction of the state, and 
the Village lost a measure of self-determination.  Dean B. Suagee, Cruel Irony in the 
Quest of an Alaska Native Tribe for Self-Determination, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 
495 (1999). 
 24. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 534. 
 25. Id. at 526 (quoting Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Vill. of 
Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 101 F.3d 1286, 1303 (9th Cir. 1996) (Fernandez, J., concurring)); 
see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Kluti Kaah Native Vill. of Copper Ctr., 101 F.3d 
610 (9th Cir. 1996) (invalidating tribal tax on ANCSA lands held by village corporation 
because such lands were not Indian country). 
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II.  BASIS OF NATIVE SELF-GOVERNMENT  
AND JURISDICTION IN ALASKA 
A.  Inherent Powers of Tribal Sovereignty 
Tribal sovereignty has been recognized since the early days of the 
United States, both in court decisions and by the federal government’s 
practice of entering into treaties with the various Indian tribes and 
nations.  As sovereigns, tribes retain all inherent powers not specifically 
limited by Congress or inconsistent with their dependent status.26  In 
other words, there is a presumption that tribal sovereign powers remain 
intact unless divested.27  Sovereignty “exists only at the sufferance of 
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.  But until Congress 
acts . . . Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not 
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of 
their dependent status.”28 
B. Territory and Membership 
Generally speaking, sovereigns exercise authority, or jurisdiction, 
over their territory as well as over other people who enter their territory.  
As the Alaska Supreme Court has recognized, the “dual nature of Indian 
sovereignty” derives from “two intertwined sources: tribal membership 
and tribal land.”29  Although ordinarily these aspects of jurisdiction are 
 
 26. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 146 (1982); Oliphant 
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (discussing tribal courts’ criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians).  The Oliphant decision marked a radical departure in 
federal Indian law, one quite disturbing to proponents of tribal sovereignty.  Before 
Oliphant, it was settled law for almost 150 years that tribes retained all powers of 
internal sovereignty—that is, its powers of local self-government—that were not 
divested by treaties or express legislation of Congress.  FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 232–33 (Michie ed. 1982).  The Oliphant court for the first time 
deduced another category of powers lost by tribes: those “inconsistent with their status” 
as sovereigns subordinate to the federal government.  435 U.S. at 208.  Therefore, 
Oliphant permitted a court to decide, as a matter of federal common law, that a particular 
exercise of tribal authority was inconsistent with the tribe’s dependent status, even if 
Congress had not explicitly divested that authority.  Id. 
 27. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 751 (Alaska 1999). 
 28. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).  The “plenary power” of 
Congress over tribes has been called into question by those who argue that international 
human rights law would not countenance congressional abolition of a tribe’s sovereignty.  
See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court’s “Whack-a-Mole” Game Theory in 
Federal Indian Law, A Theory That Has No Place in the Realm of Environmental Law, 7 
GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 90, 164–66 (2002). 
 29. John, 982 P.2d at 754 (emphasis in original). 
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intertwined, they are analytically distinct, as the John v. Baker majority 
demonstrated.30 
1. Land: The Territorial Aspect of Tribal Sovereignty.  The United 
States Supreme Court has recognized that “there is a significant 
territorial component to tribal power.”31  Typically tribes exercise 
jurisdiction within “Indian country,” defined as reservations, dependent 
Indian communities, and Indian allotments.32  Subject to limitations 
Congress has imposed, “Indian tribes within ‘Indian country’ . . . 
possess[] attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their 
territory.”33  Within Indian country, the federal government and tribes 
have primary authority, while outside Indian country, states have 
primary jurisdiction.  For example, in companion cases involving 
application of Alaska’s fish trap laws to Native communities, the United 
States Supreme Court held those laws inapplicable within the Annette 
Island Reserve but applicable to Natives in a village not located on a 
federal reservation.34  Tribes have greater authority over members and 
their property and limited authority over non-members within Indian 
country, while the state has correspondingly less authority.35 
Following the Venetie decision, it is clear that the extent of Indian 
country in Alaska, and thus the reach of Alaska tribes’ territorial 
jurisdiction, is quite limited.  Therefore, it is important to understand the 
 
 30. See id. (“teas[ing] apart the ideas of land-based sovereignty and membership 
sovereignty”).  But see id. at 766 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that no tribal 
court jurisdiction exists outside Indian country and that state law governs there unless 
Congress provides otherwise). 
 31. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 142. 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000). 
 33. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 140 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 
(1975)). 
 34. Compare Metlakatla Indian Cmty. v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1962) with Organized 
Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).  The Court concluded that the Natives in both 
cases had aboriginal rights to fish, but that the state could regulate the exercise of those 
rights in the absence of any federal law to the contrary.  While Metlakatla was a 
statutorily created reservation, which Congress placed under the authority of the 
Secretary of the Interior, Kake was not.  Thus, the Natives in Kake fell under state 
jurisdiction and had to follow the fish-trap prohibition, while the federal law establishing 
the Metlakata reservation pre-empted application of state law. 
 35. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (stating that tribes 
retain authority over non-Indians in Indian country when (1) the non-Indian has entered 
into a consensual relationship with the tribe, or (2) the tribe is regulating conduct that 
threatens or directly affects “the political integrity, the economic security, or the health 
and welfare of the Tribe”); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) 
(affirming a tribe’s inherent authority to assert criminal jurisdiction over non-member 
Indians). 
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nature and scope of the other primary basis for tribal jurisdiction:  
membership. 
2. Membership-Based Jurisdiction.  In John v. Baker, the Alaska 
Supreme Court considered whether the Northway Village tribal court 
had jurisdiction to decide a child custody dispute.36  A Northway 
member, dissatisfied with his tribal court’s decree, argued that ANCSA 
necessarily withdrew tribal court jurisdiction by eliminating Indian 
country.37  The Alaska Supreme Court framed the issue this way: “Do 
Alaska Native villages have inherent, non-territorial sovereignty 
allowing them to resolve domestic disputes between their own 
members?”38 
The court surveyed federal Indian law and found a category of 
tribal governmental powers deriving from “membership sovereignty,” 
including “the inherent ‘power of regulating their internal and social 
relations.’”39  While the court did not delineate all of these inherent 
membership-based powers, it found that custody disputes such as the 
one at bar lay “at the core of sovereignty—a tribe’s ‘inherent power to 
determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among 
members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members.’”40  The 
court thus concluded that Alaska Native Villages have the inherent, 
sovereign power to adjudicate child custody disputes between tribal 
members, even when the village is not located on a federal reservation.41  
The state retains concurrent jurisdiction, since all disputes outside Indian 
country are within the state’s general jurisdiction, but state courts should 
generally defer to tribal courts under the doctrine of comity.42 
 
 36. 982 P.2d 738, 748 (Alaska 1999). 
 37. Id. at 743. 
 38. Id. at 748.  The father, John Baker, a Northway Village member, challenged the 
order granting shared custody with Anita John, a member of the Mentasta Village.  The 
supreme court premised tribal court jurisdiction on the membership, or eligibility for 
membership, of the children, and remanded to the tribal court to determine, using tribal 
law, the children’s membership status.  Id. at 743.  If the children were members, or 
eligible to be members, of Northway Village, the tribal court’s subject matter jurisdiction 
would be proper and the state court should defer to the tribal court decision under the 
doctrine of comity.  Id. at 763–65. 
 39. Id. at 754–55 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886)). 
 40. Id. at 758 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)). 
 41. Id. at 743. 
 42. Id. at 763.  The court followed the Ninth Circuit in identifying two exceptions to 
the comity rule.  Id.  State courts should afford no comity to tribal court decisions if (1) 
the tribal court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or (2) the tribal 
proceedings denied due process of law.  Id.; see also Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 
805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997) (setting forth exceptions to the comity rule); Evans v. Native 
Vill. of Selawik IRA Council, 65 P.3d 58, 59 (Alaska 2003) (applying John and holding 
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As a result of John, tribal courts in Alaska have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate custody disputes involving tribal members.  The major 
questions arising out of the case involve the scope of this “inherent, non-
territorial sovereignty.”  Aside from child custody, to what other aspects 
of tribal members’ activity or property could such sovereign powers 
extend beyond Indian country? 
III.  SCOPE OF NON-TERRITORIAL TRIBAL  
RIGHTS AND JURISDICTION IN ALASKA 
Even without significant territorial jurisdiction, or even with no 
territory, Alaska Native Villages possess a number of important rights 
and privileges by virtue of their status as federally recognized Indian 
tribes.  In John v. Baker, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the 
sovereign powers of Alaska tribes also include jurisdiction over child 
custody disputes, even outside Indian country.43  The extent of this extra-
territorial jurisdiction is difficult to delineate, although inferences can be 
drawn from the reasoning and references in John and other applicable 
federal court cases.   
The discussion that follows explores three areas of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction: where tribes can clearly assert sovereignty; where tribal 
rights and jurisdiction are possible but less certain; and where tribal 
rights and jurisdiction are likely to be restricted.  The discussion that 
follows does not seek to identify and discuss all areas of possible 
jurisdiction, but only a limited selection of them.  This section assumes 
that the tribe is regulating or otherwise operating outside Indian country; 
section IV considers the extent of Indian country currently in Alaska. 
A. Clear Tribal Rights and Jurisdiction 
1. Membership, Form of Organization, and Legislation.  Tribes 
have the inherent power to determine their own forms of organization 
and membership.44 “A tribe may determine who are to be considered 
members by written law, custom, intertribal agreement, or treaty with 
the United States.”45  The inherent power to determine membership does 
 
that resolution of adoption issued by village council was not entitled to comity 
recognition because the putative father was denied due process rights). 
 43. John, 982 P.2d at 765. 
 44. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55–59 (1978).  See 
generally Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934). 
 45. COHEN, supra note 26, at 248 (citing Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 193 
U.S. 127 (1904)). 
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not depend on having a territorial base, so even “terminated” tribes with 
no Indian country at all have been found to retain this power.46 
As Congress recognized in the Indian Tribal Justice Act,47 “Indian 
tribes possess the inherent authority to establish their own form of 
government, including tribal justice systems.”48  This authority does not 
derive from a tribe’s territory, but from its status as a sovereign tribe.49  
The forms and functions of tribal government are not constrained by the 
United States Constitution, because, while recognized by the 
Constitution, tribal sovereignty was not derived from it or extinguished 
by it.50 
The powers of tribal self-government include the authority to make 
criminal and civil laws for internal affairs.51  Ordinarily such legislation 
applies only within Indian country, but a tribe’s criminal laws have been 
held to apply outside its reservation, when necessary to regulate internal 
tribal relations.52  Examples of “internal affairs” subject to tribal 
legislation include enforcement of treaty hunting and fishing 
regulations,53 recognition of marriage and divorce, the power to levy 
taxes, and the regulation and protection of tribal property.54 
2. Eligibility for Federal Programs and Services.  Since the 
beginning of the United States government’s presence in the territory of 
Alaska, Congress has recognized a responsibility to protect the welfare 
of Alaska Natives similar to its responsibility toward Native Americans 
in general.55  The 1993 listing of federally recognized Indian tribes, 
 
 46. Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 777–78 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 47. Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (1993) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et 
seq. (2000)). 
 48. 25 U.S.C. § 3601(4) (2000). 
 49. See id. § 3601(3). 
 50. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896); Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978). 
 51. COHEN, supra note 26, at 248. 
 52. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 237–38 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that Yakima 
tribal police could enforce tribal fishing regulations against tribal members off-
reservation because the tribe had treaty-reserved right to fish at “usual and accustomed” 
sites outside reservation boundaries). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See  COHEN, supra note 26, at 249–50 (citing authorities); see also Chilkat 
Indian Vill. v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1473–76 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding village’s claim 
of sovereign power to enact ordinance applicable to non-members as well as members 
and preventing removal of clan property from the village without the tribe’s consent, 
presented federal question for purposes of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1362). 
 55. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 7, at 187–225; see also Sansonetti Opinion, 
supra note 11, at 43–45 (listing thirty-two federal statutes in which Alaska Native 
Villages are treated in the same manner as Indian tribes in the lower 48 states). 
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which included 226 Alaska Native villages and regional tribes, along 
with Congress’ ratification of that list in the Federally Recognized Tribe 
List Act, reaffirmed Alaska tribes’ eligibility for “the protection, 
services, and benefits of the Federal government available to Indian 
tribes by virtue of their status as tribes.”56 
3. Eligibility to Contract or Compact Under the ISDEAA.  An 
important right that Alaska Native tribes have enjoyed since 1975 is the 
ability to enter agreements to take over federal programs and services, 
along with the associated funding, under the Indian Self-Determination 
and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA).57  The ISDEAA defines an 
eligible “Indian tribe” to include “any Alaska Native village or regional 
or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to 
[ANCSA].”58  The ISDEAA has enabled many Alaska Native village 
tribal governments, either directly or through regional organizations, to 
exert greater community control over federal programs and services 
while tailoring them to the needs of the community.59  In addition, the 
infusion of federal funds for the administration of programs and services 
under the ISDEAA has greatly assisted tribes in developing 
infrastructure and human resources.60 
4. Power to Create Corporations.  Included in the inherent 
sovereign powers of a tribe, sometimes implemented in its constitution, 
is the power to charter a corporation under tribal law.61  Alaska tribes 
 
 56. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (2004). 
 57. 25 U.S.C. § 450(b) (2000). 
 58. Id. § 450(e). 
 59. See, e.g., Maniilaq Ass’n, Position Paper of the Maniilaq Board of Directors 
Supporting Self-Determination and Opposing Regionalization of Tribal Funding in 
Alaska (July 2, 2003) (describing success of ISDEAA in advancing self-determination in 
Association’s twelve member villages) (on file with authors). 
 60. Virtually all Alaska tribes contract or compact with the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
and Indian Health Service, either directly or through tribal consortia, to provide services 
to their members under the ISDEAA.  According to the National Congress of American 
Indians (NCAI), as of January 2004, funding obligated to tribal governments and 
consortia in the form of self-determination contracts or self-governance compacts 
comprised approximately $412 million from the IHS and $93 million from the BIA.  
NCAI Fact Sheet, Federal Funding to Alaska Native Tribes at 1 (Jan. 2004) (on file with 
authors). 
 61. See Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934); Solicitor Op. Dep’t of 
Interior M-36781 at 2 (Aug. 25, 1969) (“[T]he power to create an economic development 
corporation is inherent in the tribe’s sovereignty.”).  Unlike the federal government, 
which has only those powers delegated to it by the Constitution, tribes have inherent 
authority to exercise all powers of a limited sovereign. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 
Interior Dec. 14, 19 (1934). 
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organized under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)62 can also 
incorporate under federal charters pursuant to section 17 of the IRA.63  
The two types of corporate organizations authorized by the IRA in 
Alaska are: (1) village businesses, in which all members of the village 
are also members of the corporation; and (2) cooperative associations, in 
which membership is based on “occupation or association rather than on 
strict geographic residence.”64  Section 17 charters typically contain “sue 
and be sued” clauses waiving sovereign immunity, although these 
clauses can be drafted narrowly so as to authorize the corporation to 
waive its (and not the tribe’s) immunity on a contract-by-contract basis 
and as to designated assets or collateral only.  In cases where the tribal 
government and the corporation fail to keep their activities separate, the 
corporation’s waiver could place tribal assets at risk.65  Section 17 
corporations are, like tribal governments, exempt from federal income 
tax.66 
5. Sovereign Immunity.  By virtue of their status as sovereigns, 
Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from suit unless the tribe clearly 
waives immunity or Congress abrogates it.67  Alaska Native tribes 
possess the same common law immunity, as recently reaffirmed by the 
Alaska Supreme Court in Runyon v. Association of Village Council 
Presidents.68  In Runyon, the parents of two children allegedly injured 
while participating in a Head Start program sued the Association of 
Village Council Presidents (AVCP), a nonprofit Alaska corporation 
managing the Head Start program and serving 56 Native Villages in the 
Bethel area.69  Quoting John’s statement that Native Villages retain all 
aspects of sovereignty not divested by Congress or by necessary 
implication of the tribe’s dependent status, the Runyon court found that 
“[e]ach of AVCP’s member tribes is therefore protected by tribal 
sovereign immunity.”70  The court ultimately held, however, that AVCP 
itself did not share in that immunity, so the suit against it could 
proceed.71  Because AVCP’s corporate form insulated its member 
 
 62. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2000). 
 63. Id. § 477. 
 64. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 7, at 334–35. 
 65. Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Cmty., 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1136–37 (D. 
Alaska 1978). 
 66. Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19, 20. 
 67. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58–59 (1978); see also Kiowa 
Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). 
 68. 84 P.3d 437 (Alaska 2004). 
 69. Id. at 438–39. 
 70. Id. at 439. 
 71. Id. at 441. 
OSBORNE.DOC 6/2/2005  2:09 PM 
14 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [22:1 
villages from liability for a judgment against AVCP, the court found that 
the villages were not the real parties in interest in the lawsuit and AVCP 
was not entitled to the protection of the villages’ sovereign immunity.72 
6. Tax-Exempt Financing.  The Indian Tribal Government Tax 
Status Act73 authorizes federally recognized Indian tribal governments to 
issue tax-exempt debt, provided that the proceeds are used to exercise 
“an essential governmental function.”74  The IRS has published a list of 
Alaska Native Villages considered “Indian Tribal entities” exercising 
“governmental functions” for purposes of these tax exemptions.75  
Because the interest paid on bonds issued by tribes under the Act is not 
taxable to the individual investors, they are willing to accept a lower rate 
of return, resulting in lower borrowing costs for the tribe.  This tax 
advantage can result in substantial savings when financing “essential 
governmental functions.” 
7. Child Custody and Protection.  John v. Baker affirmed the 
jurisdiction of tribal courts, concurrent with those of the state, to 
adjudicate child custody disputes, even if originating outside Indian 
country, when the child is a member or eligible to be a member of the 
tribe.76  The Alaska Supreme Court, in In the Matter of C.R.H.,77 further 
recognized that Alaska Native Villages may exercise transfer jurisdiction 
over certain child custody cases under the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA).78  The Alaska Attorney General, however, has recently 
reinterpreted the C.R.H. case narrowly, causing the Attorney General’s 
office to withdraw an advisory opinion written just two years earlier.79  
In 2002, the Attorney General read the C.R.H. case as supporting the 
broad conclusion that “state law now recognizes that tribes in Alaska 
have authority over child custody matters involving tribal children and 
need not petition the Secretary of the Interior to reassume jurisdiction 
before exercising their authority.”80 
In a dramatic about-face, the 2004 Attorney General opinion states 
that Alaska tribes do not have authority over child custody matters 
involving their children unless they have successfully petitioned the 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (2000). 
 74. Id. § 7871(b). 
 75. Rev. Proc. 2001-15, 2001-5 I.R.B. 465, 470–72. 
 76. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 759–65 (Alaska 1999). 
 77. 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001). 
 78. Id. at 854 (overruling Native Vill. of Nenana v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 
722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986) and subsequent cases). 
 79. Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. 1 (Oct. 1, 2004). 
 80. In the Matter of C.R.H., Att’y Gen. File No. 441-00-0005 (Mar. 29, 2002). 
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Secretary to reassume jurisdiction under ICWA, or a state court has 
transferred jurisdiction to the tribe under ICWA.81  In this second 
opinion, the Attorney General recognizes that the C.R.H. case overruled 
earlier cases holding that a tribe could not exercise transfer jurisdiction 
under § 1911(b) of ICWA, but insists that the earlier cases are still valid 
in asserting that Public Law 28082 stripped Alaska tribes of jurisdiction 
over child custody proceedings.83  As a result of this reversal of opinion, 
tribes who initiate child protection or custody proceedings in tribal court 
absent reassumption under ICWA will likely face resistance from the 
state. 
8. Banishing Members.  Just as a tribe has the inherent power to 
determine its membership, it also has the power to banish a member to 
protect the safety and welfare of the tribe.  In Native Village of 
Perryville v. Tague,84 an Alaska court affirmed the Village’s right to 
banish one of its members for violent behavior and to have the state 
court and state troopers assist in enforcing its order.85  Citing John, the 
court found that the tribe’s power to banish its members derives from its 
inherent authority over “internal affairs.”86 
B. Possible Tribal Rights and Jurisdiction 
1. Domestic Relations Aside from Child Custody.  The United 
States Supreme Court often includes among the inherent sovereign 
powers of tribes the authority to regulate the domestic relations of their 
members.87  Marriage and divorce are likely included among these 
powers for Alaska tribes.88  In John v. Baker, the court held that this 
power extends outside Indian country, at least with respect to 
determining custody of member children, and suggested that it might 
 
 81. Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. 3 (Oct. 1, 2004); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (ICWA 
reassumption jurisdiction); id. § 1911(b) (transfer jurisdiction) (2000). 
 82. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953), codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1162 (2000). 
 83. Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. 7–8 (Oct. 1, 2004) (discussing Native Vill. of Nenana v. 
Dep’t of Health and Soc. Servs., 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986) and In re F.P., 843 P.2d 
1214 (Alaska 1992)). 
 84. No. 3AN-00-12245 (Alaska Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2003). 
 85. Id. at 5. 
 86. Id. at 4. 
 87. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001); see also Montana v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). 
 88. See Alaska Custom Marriage Validity, Solicitor Op. Dep’t of Interior M-27185, 
54 I.D. 39 (Sept. 3, 1932) (solicitor opinion that marriage among Natives, “if entered 
into in accordance with their long-established customs, should be recognized as valid 
until Congress directs otherwise”). 
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extend even beyond that boundary.89  The logic of John should extend to 
spousal and child support cases and the like.  Challenges to a tribal 
court’s authority in some of these areas would likely occur, however, on 
jurisdictional or due process grounds.  For example, if one spouse, even 
if a member, has lived far from the village for a long time, she could 
contest a tribal court’s award of alimony or child support on the basis 
that the tribal court lacks personal jurisdiction and therefore has denied 
her due process of law.90  This challenge could be raised either as a 
defense in tribal court or as a separate claim in state court challenging 
the tribal court judgment’s right to comity under John.91  The due 
process requirement of personal jurisdiction indicates that member-
based jurisdiction may still have a territorial component.  In another 
scenario, raised by the dissent in John, a spouse or child who receives 
substantially less support under a tribal court order than he or she would 
have been entitled to under state law might challenge the order on equal 
protection grounds.92 
2. Rules of Inheritance.  Prescribing rules of inheritance for 
members has also been identified by the Supreme Court as one of the 
inherent powers of tribal self-governance.93  The dissent in John 
questioned whether “a village council on the Tanana River [could] 
exercise its sovereign powers to prescribe rules of inheritance for its 
members, including those who live in Anchorage or Los Angeles, or 
London.”94  Although it is possible that a non-resident member of an 
Alaska tribe unhappy with its inheritance law would accept Chief Justice 
Matthews’ invitation to challenge the application of that law outside 
Indian country, there is some Supreme Court precedent for off-
reservation application of tribal inheritance laws, at least in close 
proximity to the Native community.95 
 
 89. 982 P.2d 738, 756 (Alaska 1999). 
 90. See Kulko v. California Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 96–101 (1978).  The Indian 
Civil Rights Act provides that a tribe exercising powers of self-government shall not 
“deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law.”  25 U.S.C. § 
1302(8) (2000). 
 91. See John, 982 P.2d at 763 (tribal court child custody determination not entitled 
to comity when tribal court lacks subject matter or personal jurisdiction). 
 92. Id. at 795–99 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting). 
 93. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). 
 94. John, 982 P.2d at 804 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting). 
 95. See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 13 (1899) (holding that tribal determination of 
heirship of non-reservation, non-trust property is binding and cannot be modified by 
congressional acts). 
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C. Restricted Tribal Rights or Jurisdiction 
1. Authority Over Non-Members.  Tribes have sovereignty over 
their members and their territory.96  Unless Congress clearly states 
otherwise, tribes may also exercise authority over non-members within 
Indian country.97  By largely eliminating Indian country in Alaska, 
ANCSA, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Venetie, 
drastically diminished the areas within which tribes can presumptively 
regulate non-member activities.98  In Venetie, the Court held that the 
village could not tax a non-member contractor operating on ANCSA 
lands because such lands did not qualify as Indian country.99  Even 
before Venetie, the DOI Solicitor concluded that ANCSA had largely 
extinguished Indian country in Alaska and that “Alaska tribes without 
territories are also without power over non-members.”100  In John v. 
Baker, the Alaska Supreme Court suggested that tribes in Alaska may 
have limited jurisdiction over a non-member if the non-member has 
consented to such jurisdiction.101 
2. Criminal Jurisdiction.  The United States Supreme Court has 
stated that the power “to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws” is 
an element of tribal sovereignty.102  In Settler v. Lameer,103 the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed a tribe’s right to arrest members off-reservation for 
violations of tribal fishing regulations committed while off-
reservation.104  With respect to criminal jurisdiction, however, there is a 
stronger territorial component than for civil authority.  Generally, 
American criminal law requires territorial jurisdiction in order to 
exercise the power to arrest.105  The dissent in John was convinced that 
“a tribe’s inherent power to punish tribal members does not extend 
 
 96. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563. 
 97. See id. at 565 (recognizing that “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to 
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations”). 
 98. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 530–34 
(1998); see also Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 658–59 (2001) 
(holding that a tribe’s sovereign power to tax extends no further than tribal land, even 
when the fee land to be taxed was within the boundaries of the reservation). 
 99. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 534. 
 100. Sansonetti Opinion, supra note 11, at 130. 
 101. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 759 n.141 (Alaska 1999) (citing Montana, 450 
U.S. at 565). 
 102. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. 
 103. 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 104. Id. at 239. 
 105. See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 481 (1998) (“[A] state’s criminal 
law has no force and effect beyond its territorial limits.”); id. § 487 (“[J]urisdiction 
resides solely in the courts of the state or county where the crime is committed.”). 
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beyond the confines of Indian country.”106  The majority decision 
supposed otherwise.107 
In April 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed a tribe’s inherent power 
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians, not just tribal members, 
within its territory.108  This authority over all Indians is perhaps limited 
to Indian country. 
Finally, Alaska is a “P.L. 280 state,” so-called after the 1953 
termination-era federal law granting criminal jurisdiction to certain 
states over Indian country within their borders.109  Therefore, even in the 
limited Indian country that may exist at present in Alaska, or in the more 
extensive Indian country we propose be established in Section V below, 
tribal criminal jurisdiction would be concurrent with the state.110 
3. Property or Use Taxes on Members.  The power to tax is 
inherent in sovereignty, and is retained by tribes except where it has 
been limited or withdrawn by federal authority.111  However, it is 
virtually certain that ANCSA lands are not subject to tribal taxation.  
The 1987 amendments to the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act (ANILCA)112 specifically exempted ANCSA lands 
from “real property taxes by any governmental entity,” so long as they 
are not developed, leased or sold to third parties.113  The statute defines 
“developed” as any change enabling “gainful and productive present 
use,” and “leased” to mean a grant of possession “for a gainful purpose,” 
but excludes activities such as exploration, surveying, and subsistence.114  
Moreover, Venetie affirmed the district court’s ruling that the village 
government, absent Indian country, could not impose business use taxes 
on non-members.115 
 
 106. John, 982 P.2d at 781 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 107. Id. at 755–59 (“Decisions of the United States Supreme Court support the 
conclusion that Native American nations may possess the authority to govern themselves 
even when they do not occupy Indian country.”). 
 108. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004). 
 109. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953), codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1162 (2000). 
 110. Public Law 280 was a grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the States, and did not 
divest tribes of their inherent criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country.  See, 
e.g., TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676, 685 (5th Cir. 1999); Walker v. 
Rushing, 898 F.2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 111. COHEN, supra note 26, at 431. 
 112. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1631–38 (2000). 
 113. Id. § 1636(d)(1)(A).  Such lands are also exempt from adverse possession, as 
well as bankruptcy and certain other judgments.  Id. 
 114. Id. § 1636(d)(2)(A). 
 115. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 534. 
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IV.  INDIAN COUNTRY IN ALASKA AT PRESENT 
The previous section examined the rights and powers of tribes in 
Alaska outside Indian country; some Indian country may exist inside 
Alaska within which Alaska tribes could exercise territorial jurisdiction, 
as well as the non-territorial rights and powers discussed above.  The 
two potential sources of Indian country in Alaska are allotments and 
restricted townsite lots.  With the qualifications set forth below, 
allotment and townsite lands could constitute Indian country and, as 
such, “will likely remain a focal point of the federal trust responsibility 
in Alaska.”116  However, the status of these lands “has yet to be 
adjudicated.”117 
A. Allotments 
Federal law defines Indian country as: (1) reservation lands, (2) 
“dependent Indian communities,” and (3) allotments.118  With the 
exception of the Annette Island Reserve for the Metlakatla Indian 
Community, ANCSA revoked all reservations in Alaska.119  Further, the 
Venetie court held that ANCSA lands were not “dependent Indian 
communities.”120  However, Alaska contains a significant amount of 
allotment lands.121  These allotment lands should be considered Indian 
country, over which tribes could potentially exert territorial as well as 
member-based jurisdiction. 
 
 116. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 7, at 152. 
 117. Id. at 428 (arguing that restricted Native allotments and Native townsites do 
constitute Indian country).  But see Donald Craig Mitchell, Alaska v. Native Village of 
Venetie: Statutory Construction or Judicial Usurpation? Why History Counts, 14 
ALASKA L. REV. 353 (1997) (arguing that ANCSA extinguished all Indian country in 
Alaska, to the extent it ever existed to begin with). 
 118. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).  The statute specifies that Indian country includes “all 
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished.”  Id. § 1151(c).  
The reference to “Indian titles” in the plural appears to refer to the titles of the individual 
Indians to the allotments, rather than “Indian title” in the sense of aboriginal title. 
 119. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (2000). 
 120. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1998) 
(holding that ANCSA lands were not “dependent Indian communities” because the 
“Tribe’s lands are neither validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, nor are they 
under the superintendence of the Federal Government”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 121. It is hard to say exactly how much land is held as Native allotments.  According 
to the General Accounting Office (GAO), in the early 1970’s approximately 10,000 
Natives applied for more than 16,000 parcels of land under the Alaska Native Allotment 
Act, and many of these applications are still being processed by the Bureau of Land 
Management.  GAO, Alaska Native Allotments and Rights-of-Way at 1 (GAO-04-923) 
(2004). 
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The Alaska Native Allotment Act of 1906 (ANAA)122 authorized 
conveyances of up to 160 acres of unappropriated land to eligible 
Natives.  Although ANAA was repealed in 1971, many allotments 
continue to be held in restricted status,123 and the federal government has 
a fiduciary duty to administer these lands for the benefit of Natives.124 
The primary obstacle with including allotments as “Indian country” 
for purposes of tribal jurisdiction in Alaska is that it may be difficult to 
establish the association of the land or the owner (or both) with a 
specific tribe.  In the lower 48 states, allotments were typically carved 
from pre-existing reservations associated with particular tribes and 
conveyed to members of those tribes.125  In Alaska, by contrast, the 
ANAA did not make tribal membership a criterion for receiving an 
allotment.  Moreover, in many cases, allotments may not be clearly 
identifiable with an acknowledged tribal land base such as a 
reservation.126  Allotment owners whose tribal affiliation cannot be 
traced to an adjacent tribe, or who have “abandoned tribal relations,” 
might be able to successfully resist the assertion of a tribe’s territorial 
jurisdiction.127 
B. Townsite Lots 
Village townsite lots also provide a possible, though limited, source 
of Indian country in Alaska.  The Alaska Native Townsite Act (ANTA), 
which was repealed in 1976,128 allowed conveyance of lots to individuals 
in certain areas designated as townsites.129  Under ANTA, both Natives 
and non-Natives were held eligible for townsite lots.  Natives generally 
received restricted title, alienable only with approval of the Secretary.130 
 
 122. Pub. L. No. 59-171, 34 Stat. 197 (repealed 1971). 
 123. Indian country includes allotments held in trust or in restricted fee.  Oklahoma 
Tax Comm’n v. Sac, 508 U.S. 114, 115 (1993). 
 124. See, e.g., Aguilar v. United States, 474 F. Supp. 840, 846 (D. Alaska 1979) 
(citing Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 249 U.S. 53 (1918); Aleut Cmty. of St. 
Paul Island v. United States, 480 F.2d 831 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 
950, 953 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). 
 125. See generally COHEN, supra note 26, at 612–615 (describing allotment of 
reservation lands in severalty under the Dawes Act). 
 126. See Sansonetti Opinion, supra note 11, at 129 (concluding that Native restricted 
allotments are Indian country for purposes of federal protection and jurisdiction, but 
nonetheless provide “little or no basis for an Alaska village claiming territorial 
jurisdiction”) (emphasis in original). 
 127. Id. at 127 (opining that no “original tribal nexus to support such jurisdiction over 
the allotment” would exist). 
 128. Pub. L. No. 69-280, 44 Stat. 629 (repealed 1976). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See generally COHEN, supra note 26, at 605–38. 
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Currently, there are more than 3,800 Native restricted townsite lots.131  
As with allotments, the federal government has a fiduciary duty with 
respect to these lands.132  Thus, if an adequate “tribal nexus” could be 
demonstrated, these lands could also be considered restricted allotments 
constituting Indian country.133 
In addition to individually owned townsite lots, village-owned 
townsite lots could also be part of Indian country.  At least twenty-seven 
Native villages own townsite lands in fee.134  Former DOI Solicitor 
Sansonetti believed that these lands would be Indian country if the area 
qualified as a dependent Indian community;135 however, Venetie makes 
clear that village-owned townsite lands do not qualify as dependent 
Indian communities.136  As land owned by the tribal governing body 
itself, village-owned townsite lots should be subject to the territorial 
control of the tribe as a property owner (just as a municipality controls 
its territory), but such lands do not appear to fit the statutory definition 
of “Indian country” and would probably remain subject to concurrent 
state jurisdiction.  Therefore, any tribal jurisdiction would likely be 
limited to members but arguably could be extended at least to non-
members who are in a consensual relationship with the tribe on tribal 
owned land. 
C. Tribal Authority within Indian Country 
Tribes have greatest authority over members and their property, and 
limited authority over non-members within Indian country, while the 
state has correspondingly less authority.  Tribes not only may exercise 
within Indian country all the rights and powers described in Section III 
above, but also others dependent on a land base, notably zoning and the 
statutory right to conduct gaming.  The following examples of rights and 
powers only apply to the Annette Island Reserve and probably to 
restricted Native allotments and Native townsites in Alaska to the extent 
they are “Indian country.” 
1. Zoning.  Tribes have the inherent sovereign authority to 
regulate land use within their territory, but this authority generally does 
not extend to non-Indian owned fee land, even within Indian country.137  
 
 131. Sansonetti Opinion, supra note 11, at 129. 
 132. Carlo v. Gustafson, 512 F. Supp. 833, 838 (D. Alaska 1981). 
 133. See Sansonetti Opinion, supra note 11, at 129–30. 
 134. Id. at 130. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 533–34 (1998). 
 137. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408, 410–12 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (holding that a tribe could zone non-Indian lands only in the “closed” portion of 
OSBORNE.DOC 6/2/2005  2:09 PM 
22 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [22:1 
The state does not have zoning authority over Indian-owned lands in 
Indian country, even in a P.L. 280 state such as Alaska.138  It follows, 
therefore, that between these limits Alaska tribes should have zoning 
authority over at least their members occupying allotments or townsite 
lots as Indian country. 
2. Gaming.  The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) grants 
tribes the exclusive right to regulate gaming on “Indian lands” in states 
where gaming is legal.139  This statute defines Indian lands as: (1) land 
within the limits of a reservation, and (2) lands “held in trust by the 
United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by 
any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States 
against alienation and over which a tribe exercises governmental 
power.”140  To the extent that allotments and townsites in Alaska are 
under the “governmental power” of a particular tribe, they should 
qualify for gaming under IGRA. 
IGRA divides gaming into three classes.  Class I gaming is 
regulated exclusively by the tribes141 and is limited to traditional forms 
of Indian gaming and social games played for prizes of minimal value.142  
Class II gaming is regulated by the tribes with oversight by the National 
Indian Gaming Commission143 and includes bingo, pull-tabs, and certain 
card games.144 Finally, Class III gaming is governed by a compact 
between the tribe and the state, or procedures issued by the Secretary of 
the Interior,145 and includes casino-type games.146  Class II and Class III 
gaming are permitted only if such gaming is otherwise permitted under 
state law by any person, organization, or entity for any purpose.147  
Alaska permits a wide range of Class II and Class III games.148 
 
the reservation, where the vast majority of the land was tribal-owned and few non-
Indians lived). 
 138. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. King County, 532 F.2d 655, 667 (9th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). 
 139. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2000). 
 140. Id. § 2703(4); see also 25 C.F.R. § 502.12 (2004).  As discussed above, ANCSA 
extinguished all reservations in Alaska except for the Annette Island Reserve.  There are, 
however, a few parcels of tribal trust land in the Southeast Alaska Communities of 
Klawok, Kake, and Angoon.  See Sansonetti Opinion, supra note 11, at 112 n.277. 
 141. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (2000). 
 142. Id. § 2703(6). 
 143. Id. § 2710(a)(2). 
 144. Id. § 2703(7). 
 145. Id. § 2710(d). 
 146. Id. § 2703(8). 
 147. Id. § 2710. 
 148. See ALASKA STAT. § 05.15.100 (Michie 2004).  Alaska law permits both Class 
II-type games (bingo, pull-tabs) and Class III-type games (lotteries).  Id. 
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3. Power over Non-Members.  Until 1981, the general 
presumption was that tribes had regulatory jurisdiction over both 
members and non-members within Indian country, regardless of the land 
status of the particular parcel.  In Montana v. United States, however, the 
Supreme Court set forth the general proposition that “the inherent 
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of 
nonmembers of the tribe” on non-Indian fee land.149  Tribes may 
regulate non-Indians on such lands only if one of two exceptions applies: 
(1) the non-Indian has entered a consensual relationship with the tribe or 
tribal member, such as a contract having to do with the land; or (2) the 
non-Indian activity threatens “the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health and welfare of the Tribe.”150  For example, tribes 
can exercise both Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act jurisdiction over 
non-Indians, even on non-Indian-owned fee land, where necessary to 
protect the health and welfare of the tribe.151  The Clean Water Act 
authority is premised on the tribe “exercising governmental authority 
over a Federal Indian reservation,” and thus does not apply in Alaska 
outside the Annette Island Reserve.152 
Although tribes have no inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-
Natives in Indian country, tribes will often enter into cross-deputization 
agreements with county or state law enforcement agencies.  Under these 
agreements, tribal officers often have authority, delegated by the state, to 
arrest non-Natives and hold them until state officers arrive, or to 
transport non-Native detainees to state authorities. 
V.  THE BENEFITS OF RESTORING INDIAN  
COUNTRY FOR RURAL JUSTICE IN ALASKA 
For many years, the State of Alaska has acknowledged that it lacks 
resources to provide adequate law enforcement and court services in 
rural Alaska. Studies have repeatedly shown that this lack of law 
enforcement services is one of the most significant reasons why Alaska 
Natives and American Indians, as well as non-Indians, living in rural 
communities face tremendous social obstacles that hinder their ability to 
live productive and satisfying lives.153  In 2004, Congress established the 
 
 149. 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). 
 150. Id. at 565–66. 
 151. See Arizona v. EPA, 151 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1998), amended by 170 F.3d 870 
(9th Cir. 1999) (Clean Air Act jurisdiction); Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 419 
(10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 965 (1997) (Clean Water Act jurisdiction). 
 152. See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(h) (2000) (defining “Indian tribe” for purposes of the 
Clean Water Act). 
 153. VILLAGE PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 1.  Documentation 
and discussion of the inadequacies and disparities in the provision of law enforcement 
and justice in rural Alaska is contained in the studies cited in note 155 infra. 
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Alaska Rural Justice and Law Enforcement Commission to study and 
report on the nature of the problem and recommended solutions.154  As 
we discuss more fully below, the best way to provide justice to all 
residents of rural Alaska is to restore the Indian country status of at least 
some tribal lands in Alaska.  This change would help resolve the present 
confusion over jurisdiction, enhance local control, allow for better 
access to federal law enforcement funds, and improve the safety of rural 
Alaskans with little or no cost to the state.  This section briefly reviews 
the factual and legal background of the problem, offers a range of 
options for addressing the problem by clarifying tribal territorial 
jurisdiction, sets forth the public policy benefits of this solution, and 
explains how the solution can be implemented. 
A. The Rural Justice Problem and the Call for “Regionalization” 
The administration of justice in rural Alaska—or the lack thereof—
has been a source of alarm for many years.  Several major studies have 
exposed the disparity between services to urban and to rural Alaskans.155  
Prior to statehood, Native villages in Alaska employed their own dispute 
resolution and peacekeeping mechanisms.  By the early 1900s, elected 
 
 154. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 112, 118 Stat. 
62 (2004).  In addition to establishing the Rural Justice Commission, Section 112 
prohibited use of funding for tribal courts or law enforcement for tribes or villages with 
fewer than 25 Native members or located within several of the more populous boroughs.  
The Commission is specifically charged with recommending ways of: (1) creating “a 
unified law enforcement system, court system, and system of local laws or ordinances 
for Alaska Native villages and communities”; (2) meeting law enforcement and judicial 
personnel needs in rural Alaska through cross-deputization or other means of 
maximizing existing federal, state, local, and tribal resources; (3) addressing regulation 
of alcohol; and (4) addressing domestic violence and child abuse in rural Alaska.  Id.  
Following some initial delays, the Commission was appointed in September 2004 and 
began hearing testimony in October 2004.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft Appoints the Alaska Rural Justice and Law Enforcement 
Commission (Sept. 2, 2004) (on file with authors). The Commission began hearing 
testimony in October 2004.  Press Release, U.S. Attorney, Alaska Rural Justice and Law 
Enforcement Commission Hearings (Oct. 20, 2004) (on file with authors).  The 
Commission plans to convene a series of hearings throughout rural Alaska, and report 
with recommendations to Congress by the end of June 2005. Id. 
 155. See, e.g., ALASKA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
RACISM’S FRONTIER: THE UNTOLD STORY OF DISCRIMINATION AND DIVISION IN ALASKA 
(2002), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/ak0402/main.htm (last visited Feb. 
26, 2005) [hereinafter RACISM’S FRONTIER]; COMM’N ON RURAL GOVERNANCE AND 
EMPOWERMENT, FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR (1999), available at 
http://www.alaskool.org/resources/anc2/ANC2_Sec2.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005); 
ALASKA NATIVES COMM’N, FINAL REPORT (1994). 
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village councils had assumed law enforcement and justice functions.156  
After statehood, however, these mechanisms were dismantled as the 
state asserted its jurisdiction, and assumed the obligation to enforce 
criminal law in rural Alaska.  The state has struggled to fulfill this 
obligation, not only due to a lack of resources but also due to cultural 
divisions between state law enforcement personnel and the diverse 
communities in rural Alaska.  Returning primary authority over certain 
criminal activity to the villages would relieve these burdens on the state 
and result in better service at the local level. 
The lack of Indian country in Alaska has presented a rationale, or 
pretext, for proponents of “regionalization” to shift the locus of 
administration of law enforcement funding and services from the Native 
villages to the state or to regional nonprofit corporations.  The 
proponents of regionalization contend that consolidating funds that 
presently flow directly to tribal governments would result in maximum 
efficiency in delivery of services to Alaska Natives.  The basic argument 
in favor of regionalization is that transferring federal funds to regional 
entities or the state would create administrative economies of scale.  
While this may be true in some cases, evidence suggests that Alaska 
tribes are not inefficient compared to other recipients of federal 
funding.157  More importantly, any administrative “efficiencies” 
 
 156. RACISM’S FRONTIER, supra note 155. 
 157. It is true that smaller tribes, with limited programs and small direct cost pools, 
will tend to have higher administrative costs in relative terms, compared with larger 
tribes or tribal organizations with larger direct pool bases.  A 1999 National Congress of 
American Indians (NCAI) report found that tribes with direct cost bases under $500,000 
had average indirect cost rates of 49.5%; tribes with direct cost bases of $1 million to $5 
million had rates averaging 31%; and tribes with direct cost bases in excess of $20 
million averaged 22.7%.  See NAT’L CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS NAT’L POLICY 
WORK GROUP ON CONTRACT SUPPORT COSTS, FINAL REPORT 8 (1999) [hereinafter NCAI 
REPORT].  Indirect cost rate is the ratio of indirect or administrative costs to direct or 
program costs.  For example, if a tribe has program costs of $200,000 and administrative 
costs of $100,000, its indirect cost rate would be 1-to-2 or 50%. 
However, it has also been shown that Alaska tribes’ indirect cost ratios compare 
favorably with those of other federally funded organizations.  The Department of the 
Interior’s Office of Self-Governance analyzed data from fiscal year 2002 regarding 23 
separate ISDEAA Title IV Compacts and Funding Agreements administered on behalf of 
170 tribes.  The overall average indirect cost rate on those compacts was 33.63%.  See 
INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL WORKGROUP ON FEDERAL CONTRACTING INDIRECT COST ISSUES, 
CONCEPT PAPER (2003) [hereinafter IOWG CONCEPT PAPER].  This figure compares 
favorably with the indirect cost rates of non-tribal recipients of federal funding, 
including government agencies.  A Department of the Interior Office of Inspector 
General Report has shown that typical non-profit rates average 53.7%.  Id. at 6.  The 
Department of Health and Human Services, with which many Alaska tribes contract and 
compact through the IHS to provide health care services, typically exceeds a 50% 
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produced by regionalization would come at the cost of tribal self-
determination and local control that is essential to effective child 
protection, law enforcement and justice.158  Without direct local 
involvement and control over these critical services, the additional 
increase in unemployment and sense of powerlessness may well 
intensify substance abuse and crime, nullifying any administrative 
“efficiencies” at the regional level.159   
Tribes and tribal organizations in Alaska share a commitment to 
cost efficiency, because their members are the ones who stand to suffer 
most from inefficiencies.  Tribes can and do voluntarily form tribal 
organizations to create economies of scale, as authorized and encouraged 
by ISDEAA.160  But tribal leaders have expressed strong objection to 
forced regionalization of law enforcement or any other programs or 
services.161  Many tribal leaders have also expressed that regionalization 
 
indirect cost rate.  Id.  In this context, Alaska tribes’ administrative overhead costs do not 
appear out of line. 
 158. COMM’N ON RURAL GOVERNANCE AND EMPOWERMENT, supra note 155, at 62 
(finding that “loss of control of local resources and local decision-making processes have 
created widespread dependence on government aid and a sense of helplessness and 
hopelessness for many Alaska Natives”). 
 159. See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Alaska Native Self-Government and 
Service Delivery: What Works? 23 Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs No. 2003-
01 (Native Nations Institute & Harvard Project on American Indian Economic 
Development, 2003) (concluding that “a push for regionalization that ignores [Natives’] 
concerns and preferences virtually guarantees a continuing legacy of disengagement, 
bitterness, and poverty, with all the attendant long-term costs for both Native people and 
other governments”); COMM’N ON RURAL GOVERNANCE AND EMPOWERMENT, supra note 
155, at 60 (recommending that, in order to break the destructive cycle of dependence, 
“state and federal governments should create and utilize all possible opportunities for 
Native tribes to demonstrate their respective capacities to regulate tribal members”). 
 160. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450(h), 458(b) (2000). 
 161. See, e.g., MANIILAQ ASS’N, POSITION PAPER OF THE MANIILAQ BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS SUPPORTING SELF-DETERMINATION AND OPPOSING REGIONALIZATION OF 
TRIBAL FUNDING IN ALASKA (2003) (on file with authors) (stating that forced 
regionalization would contravene the policy of self-determination and reverse the 
progress of creating effective tribal institutions and leadership); ASS’N OF VILL. COUNCIL 
PRESIDENTS, RESOLUTION 04-08-02 (Aug. 18, 2004) (supporting tribal control over 
funding and programs for the benefit of tribal members); TANANA CHIEFS CONFERENCE, 
RESOLUTION NO. 2004-1 (Aug. 19, 2004) (same); ALASKA FEDERATION OF NATIVES, 
RESOLUTION 03-20 (stating that “[l]egislatively mandating the regionalization of services 
would diminish local control, be contrary to long-standing federal policies favoring self-
determination, and decrease efficiency of services by removing the accountability that 
regional organizations now have to their client populations and tribes”); see also 
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS (NCAI) RESOLUTION # FTL-04-021 (revised 
Oct. 12, 2004) (“support[ing] Alaska Tribes in their opposition to regionalization and the 
incremental diminishment of tribal self-determination and sovereignty”). 
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efforts are one of the greatest threats to tribal self-determination in 
Alaska in this era, and some have characterized the impact of 
regionalization even more starkly: “[r]egionalization is termination.”162 
Despite these concerns, Senator Stevens in September 2003 
introduced an appropriations bill rider that would have re-directed all 
funds for Alaska tribal law enforcement and justice systems from the 
U.S. Department of Justice to the State of Alaska, removing a great deal 
of Native discretion over this much needed funding for tribal police and 
courts.163  The rider was driven in part by the misconception that Alaska 
Native tribes do not have concurrent criminal jurisdiction over their 
members.164  Although the rider was not enacted, similar proposals may 
well arise in the future, perhaps as recommendations from the Alaska 
Rural Justice and Law Enforcement Commission.165 
The Commission, which was established by another Stevens 
appropriations rider, is required to consider a number of issues, 
including an explicit regionalization scheme “[c]reating a unified law 
enforcement system, court system, and system of local laws or 
ordinances for Alaska Native villages and communities of varying sizes 
including the possibility of first, second and third class villages with 
different powers.”166  Such a scheme would effectively terminate tribal 
jurisdiction by subsuming villages into the state system of municipal 
government and the unified state court system.167 
 
 162. Native American Rights Fund, Regionalization by Any Other Name is 
Termination, 29 NARF Legal Review 1 (2004), at http://www.narf.org/pubs/nlr/nlr29-
2.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005); see also, e.g., NCAI, RESOLUTION #ABQ-03-045 
(2003), available at http://www.ncai.org/data/docs/resolution/annual2003/03-045.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (regionalization “amounts to nothing less than the termination 
of the existing sovereignty of Alaska Native tribes”).  See generally COHEN, supra note 
26, at 180–88 (recounting the repudiation of the termination policy in favor of the 
current policy of tribal self-determination). 
 163. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2004, S. 1585, 108th Cong. § 109 (2004). 
 164. A group of law professors expert in federal Indian law reached the opposite 
conclusion: “Federal law recognizes that tribal jurisdiction may be membership-based 
and is not solely dependent on the existence of Indian country.  To deprive tribes of 
funding for courts or law enforcement programs based on a legal theory that they lack 
jurisdiction over their own members is simply in error.”  Letter from Joseph William 
Singer et al., to Gayle Norton, Sec’y of the Interior, at 10 (Oct. 22, 2003) (on file with 
authors). 
 165. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 112, 118 Stat. 
3, 62 (2004). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Unlike many states, the Alaska Constitution requires a unified state court 
system.  Cities and boroughs (the Alaska equivalent of counties) cannot operate separate 
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To the extent that proposals to regionalize rural justice funding are 
sincerely based on a perceived jurisdictional infirmity—i.e., that Alaska 
tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over their own members in the absence 
of Indian country—the recommendations in the next section should be 
embraced by regionalists.  If, however, the calls for regionalization mask 
a desire to minimize, if not eliminate, tribal sovereignty and self-
determination, our proposals are sure to meet continued determined 
resistance from regionalists.  In any event, decisions about how best to 
respond to the rural justice crisis should be made in light of the public 
policy considerations we detail below, and not just on the basis of an 
administrative efficiency model that ignores the role of tribal self-
determination and governance in the delivery of effective law 
enforcement and judicial services.168 
B. Recommendation: Clarify Jurisdiction by Restoring Indian Country 
The uncertainty regarding tribal territorial jurisdiction presents a 
major and unnecessary obstacle to restoring justice in rural Alaska.  The 
Alaska Rural Justice and Law Enforcement Commission should 
recommend to Congress that Indian country status be restored to all 
tribal lands, including those controlled by the tribes’ ANCSA 
corporations.  If this were to occur, the state would maintain concurrent 
jurisdiction over most crimes due to Public Law 280.169  This is a 
beneficial proposition for the State, because it would not only retain 
criminal jurisdiction but also gain local law enforcement partners.  
 
judicial systems (even if they could afford them).  See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“The 
courts shall constitute a unified judicial system for operation and administration.”). 
 168. It is worth noting that Congress has repeatedly stated over the past decades that 
tribal self-determination and self-governance have been unprecedented successes in 
federal Indian policy, and as a result, tribes today have the administrative capacity and 
technical expertise to deliver a full range of governmental services more effectively than 
if non-tribal entities, such as the state or federal government, delivered those services.  
See, e.g., S. Res. 106-277, 106th Cong. (2000) (describing self-determination as “the 
most successful policy of the United States in dealing with the Indian tribes”); S. REP. 
NO. 103-374, at 1 (1994) (report accompanying 1994 ISDEAA amendments and noting 
that “[t]he policy of self-determination has proven to be very successful”); S. REP. NO. 
100-274, at 4 (1987) (“remarkable” development of tribal government during previous 
twelve years “is directly attributable to the success of the federal policy of Indian self-
determination”). 
 169. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953), codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1162 (2000).  Public Law 280 granted criminal jurisdiction over Indian country 
to certain states (including Alaska); however, the law was a grant of concurrent authority 
and did not divest tribes of their inherent criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian 
country.  See, e.g., TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676, 685 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. Super. Ct. of Okanogan County, 945 F.2d 
1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1991); Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1990). 
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Creating territorial boundaries within which Alaska tribes can exercise 
jurisdiction is a rational and feasible approach to correcting the present 
anomaly of village governments that are recognized to have and exercise 
some governmental powers, but that have little territorial jurisdiction.  
This solution supports a number of public policy objectives, as discussed 
in the next subsection, and could be easily implemented, as shown in 
subsection D below. 
Alternatively, a more limited solution would be to craft legislation 
restoring the Indian country status of an Alaska tribe’s ANCSA lands 
only when the village and its affected village and regional corporations 
agree.  The corporations would continue to manage their lands, and the 
State would continue to have concurrent (though no longer exclusive) 
criminal jurisdiction.  The agreement could be flexible, for example by 
limiting (or barring) taxation of the corporation, or preserving existing 
land uses.  Where the corporate shareholders are also members of the 
village, the convergence of interests in good government services and 
corporate health should make such agreements plausible.  Even where 
the ownership or interests of the corporation diverge somewhat from 
those of the village, the corporation might well prefer that primary 
regulatory jurisdiction over its lands lie with the village rather than with 
the State.  And of course, if either party prefers the status quo, no 
agreement would be required and no Indian country need be created. 
A third, even more modest alternative would be to ask Congress to 
designate the federally recognized Alaska Native Villages and their 
surrounding areas “dependent Indian communities” for purposes of the 
Indian country statute.  This would leave most ANCSA lands under the 
jurisdiction of the State, but would erase any question that tribes have 
concurrent criminal jurisdiction over Natives and, in some 
circumstances, non-Natives within the limited territory of the villages.  
The State would retain concurrent Public Law 280 jurisdiction over 
these lands.170 
C. Policy Objectives Supporting Recommendation to Restore Indian 
Country 
Restoration of Indian country status to some, if not all, tribal lands 
would remove any doubt about the legitimacy of village-based law 
 
 170. We do not attempt, in this article, to explore all of the potential ramifications of 
restoring Indian country to Alaska, but limit ourselves to criminal jurisdiction for 
purposes of rural law enforcement and justice services.  Many other issues—including 
the impact that restoring Indian country would have on the civil-regulatory authority of 
the tribes and the States—would require careful consideration.  Our purpose is not to 
exhaust the issues, but to advance the dialogue by presenting for discussion clear 
proposals with a sound basis in law and public policy. 
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enforcement and justice services in rural Alaska.  Implementing such a 
system would benefit both state and tribal governments in a number of 
ways.  The following policy objectives have all been articulated by the 
State or by reports commissioned by the State, and would all be 
advanced by our recommended solution. 
1. Provide Effective Service to Rural Residents.  Most 
fundamentally, community-oriented law enforcement and justice 
systems work better than those imposed uniformly by a central state or 
federal agency on diverse local communities.  Research on Native 
policing shows that the transfer of control to local tribal authorities 
enhances community satisfaction with policing and police 
accountability.171  As recently stated, “[t]he general point is that self-
determined institutions, ones that reflect American Indian nations’ 
sovereignty, are more effective.”172 
2. Enhance Local Control.  The reason village-based justice 
works better is that the local community has both the authority and the 
responsibility to deal with local social problems, rather than ceding that 
responsibility entirely to the state and fostering a sense of powerlessness.  
Major studies of Alaska Native affairs in the last decade have concluded 
that the State should work with Alaska’s tribes to enhance local 
control.173  As far back as 1980, the State recognized that increased 
Native local control was a means to improve rural law enforcement.174 
 
 171. See, e.g., STEWART WAKELING ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICING ON 
AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 54–56 (2001); Eileen Luna, Law Enforcement 
Oversight in the American Indian Community, 4 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 149, 150–51 
(1999). 
 172. WAKELING ET AL., supra note 171, at ix. 
 173. In 1999, the Alaska Commission on Rural Governance and Empowerment 
recommended that the state judicial branch continue outreach programs with rural 
residents to develop appropriate mechanisms to respond to rural needs.  COMM’N ON 
RURAL GOVERNANCE AND EMPOWERMENT, supra note 155, at 107.  In 1994, the Alaska 
Natives Commission recommended that “[t]he State of Alaska should enter into formal 
agreements with each ‘Village Court’ . . . to determine which infractions or which 
classes of infraction will be the domain of the ‘Village Court’ and which will be the 
domain of the state government.”  ALASKA NATIVES COMM’N, supra note 155, at 172. 
 174. See VILLAGE PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER PROGRAM, supra note 1.  That report 
recognized a range of infractions and misdemeanors “that could best be resolved by the 
application of sanctions reflecting village norms and conditions, without entering the 
formal processing of the State’s criminal justice system.”  Id. at 9. The advantages 
foreseen included an increase in local control and self-determination, as well as direct 
economic and employment benefits to rural Alaska.  Id. at 10–11. 
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3. Encourage Flexibility, Tolerance and Diversity.  Alaska’s 
villages differ widely in terms of their cultural values, traditions of 
peacekeeping and rehabilitation, and patterns of criminal behavior.  
Enhanced local control would enable each community to tailor its 
limited resources in the way that best addresses its cultural and 
criminological profile.  Villages would continue to partner with the State 
and, where they deem appropriate, with regional tribal consortia.175 
4. Bridge Cultural Divisions.  Native values and priorities can 
also differ widely from those of the non-Native society.  Expanding the 
role of village governments in the provision of rural justice services 
would help bridge the cultural division between offenders and those 
administering justice, which experts feel is critical in promoting 
rehabilitation and reducing recidivism.176 
5. Access Federal Resources.  Any system to provide effective 
law enforcement and justice in rural Alaska will be expensive because of 
the sheer size and remoteness of the area.  Because of their status as 
federally recognized entities, Alaska Native Villages can access sources 
of funding that the State cannot, such as Department of Justice (DOJ) 
funding for tribal law enforcement and justice systems, and Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) law enforcement funds.  Senator Stevens’ proposal 
last year to divert DOJ tribal funds to the State cast the tribes and the 
state as competitors, and would only have exacerbated the cultural 
divisions and lack of local control noted above.  If Indian country were 
restored in Alaska, tribes might be eligible for and have access to even 
more federal rural justice funding. 
In addition to these benefits, restoring Indian country would 
facilitate tribal economic development in general, which in turn would 
reduce some of the social ills—poverty, unemployment, and alcohol 
abuse—that fuel crime.  Researchers from the Harvard Project on 
American Indian Economic Development concluded that the Venetie 
 
 175. As the Alaska Advisory Committee to the United States Civil Rights 
Commission pointed out, “[m]any legal experts agree that tribal courts should be used 
more extensively as a cost-effective means of reducing state and federal court costs 
while at the same time allowing tribal members to be more involved with the law and 
legal process.”  RACISM’S FRONTIER, supra note 155. 
 176. In their final report, the Alaska Natives Commission found that the recidivism 
statistics among Alaska Natives reflect a built-in bias against Native Villagers, who are 
generally placed on probation or parole in alien environments in Anchorage or 
Fairbanks, and that “it is essential for the state government to develop alternatives to the 
current system of probation [and] parole . . . [to] enabl[e] Alaska Natives to complete 
their time in their home villages” under village supervision rather than in the cities.  
ALASKA NATIVES COMM’N, supra note 155, at 177. 
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decision “places additional barriers on the path to Native economic 
development” in Alaska, and that “the jurisdictional constraints on 
Alaska Native communities are one of the primary obstacles they face in 
economic development.”177  Removing these barriers would improve the 
lives of Natives while spurring rural economies, which could be a boon 
rather than a burden to the State.178 
Even more fundamentally, clarifying the scope of tribal jurisdiction 
in Alaska would help tribes maintain and develop stable institutions.  
For too long, Alaska tribes have been subjected to shifting and 
conflicting pronouncements by the State regarding tribal status and 
jurisdiction.  For example, as discussed earlier, the Alaska Attorney 
General recently issued an opinion on tribal court jurisdiction in Indian 
Child Welfare Act cases that largely reverses an opinion on the same 
subject written just two years before.179  In the earlier opinion, the 
Attorney General concluded that “state law recognizes that tribes in 
Alaska have authority over child custody matters involving tribal 
children and need not petition the Secretary of the Interior to reassume 
jurisdiction before exercising their authority.”180  In the later opinion, 
however, the Attorney General reversed course and declared that a tribe 
does not have jurisdiction over child custody matters unless the tribe 
successfully petitions the Secretary to reassume jurisdiction or unless a 
state court grants a transfer.181  This legal about-face exemplifies the 
state’s history of wild swings in policy, as each administration seeks to 
impose its own politicized reinterpretation of apparently settled law.  
Such shifting sands are not the foundation upon which stable institutions 
can be built.  Federal law clearly affirming the concurrent jurisdiction of 
 
 177. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 159, at 21 (concluding “[t]he clear implication of the 
research summarized above is that affirming and increasing the jurisdictional powers of 
Alaska Native groups would enhance their development prospects”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 178. See COMM’N ON RURAL GOVERNANCE & EMPOWERMENT, supra note 155, at 60 
(suggesting “federal and state governments must implement policies and enact necessary 
statutes that give maximum local powers and jurisdiction to tribes and tribal courts in the 
areas of alcohol importation and control, community and domestic matters, and law 
enforcement”).  The Commission implicitly called for overruling the Venetie case when 
it recommended that Congress repeal the ANCSA provision on which the Supreme Court 
largely relied for its decision—that land claims be settled “without establishing any 
permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations, without creating 
a reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship, and without adding to the 
categories of property and institutions enjoying special tax privileges.”  Id. at 56 (quoting 
43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (2000)). 
 179. See discussion supra section III(A)(7). 
 180. Op. Alaska Att’y Gen., In the Matter of C.R.H., Att’y Gen. File No. 441-00-
0005 (Mar. 29, 2002). 
 181. Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. 4 (Oct. 1, 2004). 
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tribes and the State within Alaska Indian country, however extensively 
delineated, may be the only way to end the political whip-sawing and 
enable cooperative solutions to emerge over time. 
D. Implementing the Recommendation 
Restoration of Indian country in Alaska could be achieved by 
simple legislation amending the “Indian country” statute.182  The first 
alternative, which would include ANCSA lands (effectively overruling 
Venetie), could be accomplished by adding a new subsection so that 
Indian country means “any lands owned or controlled by any Alaska 
Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or 
established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.”  This 
language accords with other federal statutes, such as the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, that treat Alaska tribes in 
the same way as tribes in the Lower 48.183 
The second alternative, which would allow tribes, village 
corporations, and regional corporations, at their option, to reclaim the 
Indian country status of ANCSA lands, would be somewhat more 
complicated but might include amending the Indian country statute to 
include the following: 
(d) any lands owned or controlled by any Alaska Native village or 
regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to 
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act; provided, however, that 
such lands will only constitute Indian country when the village and 
the village and regional corporations enter into a written agreement to 
that effect approved by the Secretary of the Interior.  The Secretary 
shall ensure that any agreement to reassume Indian country status 
shall be accompanied by a suitable plan to exercise the jurisdiction 
attendant upon such status. 
Finally, the modest proposal to designate only the villages 
themselves as Indian country might be accomplished by amending 
subsection (b) of the statute (new language in italics), so that Indian 
country includes the following: 
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United 
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory 
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state; such 
communities are to include all Alaska Native villages recognized by 
the Secretary of the Interior as eligible for the services provided to 
Indian tribes because of their status as Indian tribes; and . . . . 
Undoubtedly other alternatives are worth considering, but these 
proposals provide a starting point for discussion, and indicate that 
reintroducing a territorial component to Alaska tribal jurisdiction 
 
 182. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000). 
 183. See 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) (2000). 
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through federal legislation would be a relatively simple matter. 
Restoring Indian country to Alaska would make clear that tribes 
and the State share concurrent jurisdiction over most crimes committed 
on or near tribal lands, and demonstrate that tribes and the State are 
partners, not competitors, in providing services in rural Alaska.  The 
State of Alaska should accept the responsibility to be a good neighbor to 
the State’s Native villages.  Our legislative proposals provide a 
framework within which a healthier relationship between the State and 
Alaska Native tribal governments can develop.  Tribal jurisdiction in 
rural Alaska is not a threat to the State’s authority, but a mutually 
beneficial opportunity to secure the resources needed to make rural 
Alaskans, both Native and non-Native, more safe. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The status of Alaska tribal governments as federally recognized 
tribes now appears well-established, and even with a limited territorial 
base in “Indian country,” Alaska tribes retain important rights and 
powers by virtue of their inherent sovereignty and their member-based 
jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, the limited territorial jurisdiction of Alaska 
tribes has rendered them vulnerable to “regionalization” schemes 
premised in part on the tribes’ supposed lack of jurisdiction over their 
members, particularly in the rural justice and law enforcement context.  
Restoring the “Indian country” status of tribal lands in Alaska would 
rectify Alaska tribes’ anomalous status as “sovereigns without territorial 
reach,” allow Alaska tribes to function under the same criminal and civil 
regulatory regimes as all other tribes in Public Law 280 states, and make 
clear that Alaska tribes share concurrent criminal jurisdiction with the 
State.  Clarifying tribal territorial jurisdiction would also promote 
economic development and the formation of stable tribal institutions, 
resulting in fewer crimes.  Most importantly, clarifying tribal jurisdiction 
would enable the tribes, which represent the only real government 
presence in much of rural Alaska, to provide residents more effective 
law enforcement and justice. 
